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PATENT MONOPOLIES AND FREE ENTERPRISE*
MYRON W. WATKINS t and GEORGE W. STOCKING t
Public policy has long recognized the intimate relation between a
dynamic technology and a well-adjusted economy. Without experiment,
industrial arts stagnate. Rightly understood, invention is synonymous with
improvement in the industrial arts, and invention comes about only from
experimenting. Not every inventor finds what he is looking for, true
enough, or is looking for what he finds. But unless, consciously or uncon-
sciously, he is seeking a new way to do something or a new "combination
of matter" he will never discover anything.
To encourage experiment and thus foster technical improvment is the
avowed purpose of the American patent system. The men who wrote the
Constitution did not mention "patents" but they did authorize Congress
"To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts." The Constitution, more-
over, specifies how this power, alone among the enumerated powers of
Congress, shall be exercised. It limits congressional discretion in choice
of means for accomplishing this end to ". . . securing for limited Times
to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .Discoveries." 1
ORIGINS OF PATENT SYSTEM
England for more than a century and a half prior to the writing of
* In slightly altered form, this article will constitute a chapter in a book entitled
MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE, soon to be published by the Twentieth Century Fund.
The authors have collaborated on two earlier books published by the Twentieth Century
Fund-CARTELS IN AcTIOx (1946), and CARTELS OR COMPETITION (1948).
tFormerly Professor of Economics, New York University; now consulting economist,
New York City.
T: Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University.
1. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, ff 8 provides that "The Congress shall have Power
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
A common mistake is to associate the Constitutional authorization to promote the
progress of "Science" with the grant of patents to "Inventors." But the branch of
knowledge now called science was in the eighteenth century termed natural philosophy.
As the men who drafted the Constitution used the term, "Science" embraced all knowl-
edge. If the eighth paragraph of Art. I, § 8 had been divided into two paragraphs, in-
stead of covering both copyrights and patents in a single paragraph, these would have
read:
"8a. To promote the Progress of Science by securing for limited Times to Authors
the exclusive Right to their Writings.
"8b. To promote the Progress of useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their Discoveries."
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 332,
68 Sup. Ct. 550, 92 L. Ed. 649 (1948), Mr. Justice Burton makes a comparable division
but limits it, unfortunately, to the instrumental clause beginning "by securing . . ." No
reason is suggested, and in fact none exists, for not carrying the same division straight
through the substantive clause itself, as in the paraphrase of this section (8a and 8b)
above. Even so discriminating a scholar as Walton H. Hamilton missed this point. See
his pamphlet, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 1 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
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the United States Constitution had recognized the great advantage for
industrial development of encouraging inventors with limited-term monop-
olies. The famous Statute of Monopolies of 1623 explicitly exempted from
its sweeping proscription of exclusive privileges those patents given in-
ventors for introducing "any manner of new Manufactures within this
Realm." 2 Parliament, it is clear, made the grant of monopoly privileges to
inventors an exception to the general rule.
Free access to all technological methods of established trades was
made inviolable. Not subject to the let or leave of anyone was the right of
an Englishman, if entitled to practice any trade, to practice it as others
customarily practiced it. Such was the meaning of the Statute of Monopolies.
But so important was it thought to be for innovators to discover new
ways of making things or new things to make that Parliament undertook
to stimulate such activity by offering to traders, for devising a novel "man-
ner of manufacture," what immemorial experience indicated they most
coveted: freedom from competition.
But lest the monopoly privileges of inventors become an obstruction
to the general freedom of trade and a drag on economic progress-in short,
lest the exception become the rule-the statute limited the life of patents
for invention to 14 years.3 Parliament apparently reasoned that a period of
this duration was sufficient to enable infant industries to acquire strength
to stand on their own feet, without benefit of a public franchise.
CHANGES IN NATURE OF INVENTION
The distinctive features of the American patent system derive from
the circumstances prevailing at the time of its origin. As it originated
when handicraft was characteristic of technology, it was adapted to the
discovery and improvement of tool-using techniques. 4 For this purpose it
2. 21 JAMiES 1, c. 3, § V (1623).
3. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, both in England and America, grants
of exclusive privileges, whether in the form of patents for invention or of copyrights,
were always for a period representing some multiple of seven years. The original copy-
right statute, 8 ANNE, c. 19 (1709), specified a term of 14 years, renewable for the
same term. In the United States, the 14-year term applied to both copyrights and patents
at first, though copyrights were subject to renewal for another 14 years. In 1831, the
initial copyright period was extended to 28 years. The 17-year term of patents was
adopted in 1861. It represented a split-the-difference compromise between those who
wanted a flat extension of the term to 20 years and those who wanted simply to eliminate
the discretionary 7-year extension that Congress had authorized in 1836.
4. The explanation of the original selection of a 14-year term for patents in 1623
is found mainly in the circumstance that the conventional period of apprenticeship for
most crafts under the guild system as regulated by the Statute of Apprentices, 1562,
5 ELIZ., c. 4, was seven years. Parliament probably considered that the introduction of a
new trade and its establishment on a sure footing required training in the new art of
more than a single complement of artisans. With tn.o "classes" of fulfledged journeymen
from which to recruit a corps of workers, there would be opportunity for anl enter-
prising "master" to set up shop for himself and provide effective competition in tile
practice of the invention.
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looked to the initiative and resourcefulness .of individuals. And it did not
look to them in vain. Under then existing conditions, invention involved
tinkering with tangible things. Commonly, it was not even a full-time job.
Rather, it was a sideline, often a mere pastime.
The patent' system contemplated that the artisan at his bench or the
manufacturer familiar with certain productive processes would from time
to time hit upon a short cut, or perhaps devise some new method. 5 It was
presumed that he would himself make commercial use of his discovery
and, armed with a patent, prevent others from using it.
At the same time, in view of the comparatively slow advhnce in a
technology still dominated by manual skill, improvements" subject to patent
seemed unlikely to be frequent or radical enough to enable an inventor
to monopolize an entire branch of industry. Others, it was assumed, would
,continue to make and sell the same product in the traditional way, or to
make and sell conventional products for which a patented product was only
a substitute. Thus competition would not disappear, and "going concerns"
would be in position to utilize the invention when the patent expired. In
the days of slow, costly transport and local markets, this was not an unjusti-
fied assumption. Under such conditions there was no anomaly in offering a
public reward to a "true and sole inventor."
The growth of corporate enterprise and the prbdigious development
of physical science in the nineteenth century led to a gradual eclipse of the
independent inventor. In the first place, ready access to current tech-
nological usage was blocked because of the concentration of production
in most industries under control of a comparatively few large corporations
representing a heavy capital investment. Such enterprises do not usually
open their facilities to the experiments of outside "inventors" with a roving
curiosity.
Similarly restrictive of opportunity for casual experimentation by in-
dividuals was the change in the qualifications and equipment necessary for
significant invention. The progress of science made available for techno-
logical adaptation a bewildering assortment of obscure chemical reactions,
subtle biological processes, invisible electrical phenomena and elusive kinetic
forces. The mastery of these varied and cumulatively complex scientific
advances, to subdue them to industrial application, was not a task for lone
inventors, however versatile. It called for well-financed, systematically or-
ganized, and highly specialized research in elaborately equipped laboratories.
5. See Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEM1P. PROB. 649, 678
(1947). It is significant that the patent system first appeared in an era when the only
resources on which inventors could draw, other than the knowledge derived from prac-
tice and observation, were those of a "natural philosophy" which was an avocation,
chiefly, of schoolmasters and clergymen. When the United States patent system was
established even the atmosphere was still empty space except for Priestly's "phlogiston."
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Invention in the twentieth century became, therefore, characteristically a
group process. 6 It is a pure legal fiction to assume, as do the patent laws,
that some "true and sole inventor" can be found who alone is responsible
for every discovery issuing from the highly articulated experiments of a
great industrial laboratory employing scores, even hundreds, of technicians.
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST PATENT PERVERSION
Radical changes, both in technology and in the organization of industry,
have so altered the nature of invention and the economic position of in-
ventors as to cast strong doubt on whether patents are a suitable stimulus
to individual experimentation and innovation under modern conditions.
Though the patent system today still serves this basic purpose, it tends
to funnel the major benefits of the monopolistic privileges it creates into
the hands of large corporations, which find these grants useful as an adjunct
and aid in restraining competition.
Quite apart from these fundamental changes in the institutional envi-
ronment, patents are a rather awkward way of stimulating and rewarding
inventors, even in an economy made up mainly of small-scale enterprises
using handicraft techniques and catering to local markets. The founders
of the American patent system were aware of the dangers inherent in
governmental grants of monopoly privileges in any economy that depends
on free enterprise and competition to protect the public interest. They tried
to guard against those dangers.
The most obvious safeguard was the limitation of patent grants to 14
years. Another was the requirement of disclosure; the law required a patent
applicant to specify exactly what he claimed to have discovered "to the end
that the public may have the full benefit thereof after the expiration of
the patent term." 7
6. See Conant, The Place of Research in Our National Life, 26 HARV. Bus. REv.
46, 50-51 (1948) ; Kahn, Deficiencies of American Patent Law, 30 AMr. EcoN. REv. 475,
478-82 (1940); Petro, Patents: Judicial Developments and Legislative Proposals, 12 U.
OF CHI. L. REv. 80 & 352, 352-81 (1945); and HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTER-
PRISE 43-44 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
7. For citations of the early patent statutes and general information on the develop-
ment of legislative policy and administrative practice, see Outline of the History of tile
United States Patent Offlce, 18 J. OF PATENT OFFICE SOC. (1936). The Society published
this useful study serially on the centenary of the basic statute still in force, the Act of
July 4, 1836.
Both the first (1790) and second (1793) patent acts required enough disclosure to
distinguish the alleged invention from the prior art. The third (1836) patent act went
farther. It required the specification of "claims," a detailed differentiation from the
elements "before known or used" of "the part, improvement, or combination which lie
claims as his own invention or discovery." Thus it put the responsibility on the inventor
to winnow the grain from the chaff. If he "claims" as his invention more than what is
novel, the Patent Office may reject his application, or require its amendmetit. And if a
patent issues with a claim broader than the invention, the courts may invalidate it.
"[T]he claims measure the invention." Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419, 28 Sup. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (1908). See also, General Electric
Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 58 Sup. Ct. 899, 82 L. Ed. 1402 (1938);
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A third safeguard was the restriction of the subject matter of patent-
able invention to technological devices. The words of the original patent
act of 1790 clearly reflect congressional intent to limit in this way the
discoveries or contrivances eligible for patents. The statutory definition
embraced any "useful art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, or any
improvement therein, not before known or used." 8 These terms connote
technological advance; they carry no suggestion of permitting monopoly
privileges for new toys, medicines, or other consumable commodities. Finally,
the law authorized administrators to issue patents only for inventions that
were, in their judgment, "sufficiently useful and important" to warrant a
monopoly grant.
Congress later abandoned this prerequisite for a patent. In 1793 it
adopted the so-called registration system, under which the patent issues as
a matter of course if the application is in proper form.9 The issuance of the
and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 68 Sup. Ct. 440, 92 L. Ed.
588 (1948). The majority opinion in the Wabash case and the concurring opinion by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Kalo case grounded the invalidity of the patents in con-
troversy on the patentee's failure clearly to specify the novel elements in his invention.
8. The second (1793) patent act substituted "composition of matter" for "device."
This change was apparently designed to cover new chemical compounds. It did not
modify the emphasis of the original definition on novel technological contributions. But
subsequent judicial and administrative interpretations of the definition have broadened
the scope of patentable subject matter to embrace contrivances of every kind-even
consumable commodities-provided they. are "new and useful." See WAITE, PATENT LAW
25-26 (1920).
The only subsequent changes in the statutory scope of patentable subject matter
were an amendment of 1842 authorizing patents for designs and an act of 1930 which
made eligible new varieties of botanical plants. The propagation of hybrid plants is
doubtless a "useful art," but mere ornamentation is in a different category. Nevertheless,
a Supreme Court solicitous of property rights and tolerant of their rapid extension into
the public domain, upheld the design-patent law. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 14 Wall.
511, 20 L. Ed. 731 (U.S. 1872). It did so, notwithstanding an express finding that the
act was "plainly intended to give encouragement to the decorative arts" and that "giving
certain new and original appearances to a manufactured article may enhance its salable
value." 14 Wall. at 524. (Italics supplied.) It apparently escaped the notice of the Court
that, however laudable such an object may be, it does not lie within the Constitutional
powers of Congress, or, if so, at any rate not within the specific grant in Art. I, § 8, ir 9.
Nevertheless, decorative designs are still subject to patent, though even those who want
design protection recognize the anomaly and have long sought eligibility to copyright,
instead. See, for example, "Design Protection," Hearings before Committee on Patents
on H.R. 5859, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). The same situation exists in England: the
anomaly of design protection under the patent laws and the movement to transfer the
whole subject to the copyright laws. See "Patents and Designs Acts," Final Report of
the Departmental Committee, Board of Trade, CMD. No. 7206 (1947).
9. Jefferson was mainly responsible for the adoption of the registration system, but
he favored it, not because he thought the test of usefulness was unnecessary, but because'
as Secretary of State, charged with the chief responsibility for applying the test, he found
it took too much time from other more important duties. He said, "I know well the
difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embar-
rassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not." He had seen "with what slow
progress a system of general rules could be matured." So, to relieve the heads of
Executive Departments of this burdensome task he suggested it be "turned over to the
judiciary, to be matured into a system .. " Even so, he expressed misgivings about
the efficacy of this procedure. He considered lawyers poorly qualified for such a function,
which "is more within the information of a board of academical professors, and a
previous refusal of patent would better guard our citizens against harassment by law-
suits." The characterization of "Sage of Monticello" was well earned! See 13 WRrrINGs
oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335-36 (Mem. ed. 1904).
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patent is merely a ministerial act, not conditioned by any examination for
novelty or judgment on utility. Among the leading industrial countries, France
alone still follows this procedure.
The registration system continued until 1836, when Congress restored
the examination system. "Examination" in the Patent Office means simply
review of the prior art (as disclosed nowadays chiefly in technical publica-
tions) to determine whether the alleged invention has been anticipated.
The courts, moreover, have upheld the practice of the Patent Office in
basing the test of "sufficient" usefulness and importance merely on the
absence of inutility. Justice Story's dictum in an early case has become
settled doctrine: ". . . the word 'useful,' therefore, is incorporated into the
act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral." 10
The designers of the original patent system, then, plainly sought to
provide one that would conform closely to its constitutional mandate: to
promote, and not obstruct, "the Progress of . . . useful Arts." Each of the
specified safeguards recognized by implication that patent monopolies are
in some respects anomalous in a predominantly competitive, free-market
economy and recognized that the practical problem is one of balancing the
advantages of promoting invention against the disadvantages of restricting
competition." The first Congress showed determination to limit such special
privileges to the minimum consistent with encouragement of technological
experimentation. Later Congresses have not hewed so closely to the consti-
tutional line. Every one of the four safeguards mentioned has been weakened
in the course of a century and a half of intermittent statutory amendment.
Even if legislative policy had adhered to the original constitutional
prescription, the patent system as we know it today would still tip the scales
heavily in favor of promoting invention as against fostering competition in
trade and industry. The system would still be a bulwark of industrial monopoly
10. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cas. 1018, 1019, No. 8568 (C.C.D. Mass. 1917).
Consequently for over a century the Patent Office has gone on issuing patents on frivolous
inventions, in this respect continuing the same practice that developed under the registra-
tion system. See the testimony of Dr. Waldemar Kaempfert, science editor of the New
York Times in Hearings before the Committee on Patents on H.R. 4523, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 874 et seq. (1935). As an example of frivolous patents, he mentioned the pedal
calorificator, a device for warming one's feet by exhalations of the lungs conducted from
the nostrils through tubes!
11. The short-run problem is complex; the long-run problem is more so. No one can
be sure to what extent patent monopolies accelerate technological advance and the invest-
ments required to make its fruits available to society. Schumpeter thinks patent monopolies
may lure risk capital into enterprises that otherwise would not be launched. See
.ScH uMPErER, CAPITALISM!, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, cc. 7, 8 (1942). Veblen, Ogburn
and Ayres hold that the cumulative nature of technology makes technological innovation
practically inevitable. See VEBLpN, THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION
320, 324-86 (1919) ; OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE, pt. 2. cc. 4, 5 (1922) ; AYRES, TUE THEORY
OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS, cc. 6, 7 (1944).
Whoever is correct, one thing is certain, patent policy affects for good or ill the rate
of the commercial introduction of technological innovations. On what its precise effects
may be, it is hazardous to generalize. But the record clearly indicates that business has
used the monopoly privileges that patent policy bestows to obtain controls over industry
that antitrust policy prohibits. See text infra.
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because judicial interpretation and administrative practice gradually modified
the original safeguards until by the first decade of the twentieth century
the patent system had become a special sanctuary for trusts, pools and trade
confederacies. With the protection of patent franchises, big business has
'been able to circumvent the basic law prohibiting monopoly.12 Armed with
a patent-still better, with a whole arsenal of patent rights and patent li-
censes-a consolidation or restrictive trade 1ool was almost immune to anti-
trust action.18
EVILS OF MULTIPLICITY
If the patent system has in some important respects miscarried, the
government shares responsibility with business. If in the quest for industrial
hegemony giant corporations have used patents to stifle competition, even
in matters outside the scope of letters patent, the laxity of Congress, the
Patent Office and the courts has abetted such practices.
Congress could easily have checked one abuse-patent multiplicity-
that has contributed to the promotion of ends the patent system was never
designed to serve. Amendment of the definition of "invention" to narrow
the scope of patentable subject matter would have reduced the flood of
specious claims for special privilege. A rigorous linitation of "invention"
to new technological expedients would bring the patent system closer to the
12. Cf. HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTMPRISE 57-85, especially 62, and 134-43,
especially 141 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941), where the author says: "The 'exclusive
right' of the patentee became 'the patent monopoly,' and this was converted into a one-
way street along which no trespassers might go."
13. For notorious examples, see Bement & Sons v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S.
70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747, 46 L. Ed. 1058 (1902) ; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper
Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 Sup. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (1908) ; Leeds & Catlin Co. v.
Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 325, 29 Sup. Ct. 503, 53 L. Ed. 816 (1909) ; Henry
v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 364, 56 L. Ed. 695 (1912); United States v.
Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 33 Sup. Ct. 253, 57 L. Ed. 481 (1913) ; United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct. 473, 62 L. Ed. 968 (1918); United States v.
General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926) ; and Standard
Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 Sup. Ct. 421, 75 L. Ed. 926 (1931).
The rule was not always thus. In the 1880's a federal court held that a patent, so
far from representing an absolute property right, was invested with such public significance
that a patentee "is bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on
reasonable or equitable terms." Hoe v. Knap, 27 Fed. 204 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1886). And in
the 1890's, the Supreme Court itself showed some concern to keep patent monopolies
subservient to the public interest. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S.
425, 14 Sup. Ct. 627, 38 L. Ed. 500 (1894); and Keeler v. Standard' Folding-Bed Co.,
157 U.S. 659, 15 Sup. Ct. 738, 39 L. Ed. 848 (1895). Occasionally, moreover, even in
the heyday of the patents-as-private-monopoly doctrine, the courts stripped patent-pooling
schemes of their subterfuges and condemned them (or their practices) as restraints of
trade. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L. Ed.
107 (1912) ; United States, v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 204 Fed. 107 (W.D.N.Y. 1913) ;
and Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct.
416, 61 L. Ed. 871 (1917). Thus the path to legal sanctuary for industrial monopoly,
through patents, has not been entirely smooth and free from risk. Moreover, since the
Great Depression and the New Deal, which brought great changes both in personnel
and outlook of the Supreme Court, judicial interpretation of the patent laws has
undergone a revolutionary change. And this judicial revision of patent policy is still in
progress. See text infra.
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constitutional specification: promoting progress in the "useful Arts." Per-
haps the outstanding illustration of congressional indifference to limitation
of competition through the liberal application of the patent laws is the con-
tinued authorization of patents on foods and medicines. The evils of a
government grant of monopoly in things necessary for health and even for
human life is underscored both by recent experience and by the opposite
practice abroad.
14
Even without any statutory changes, the Patent Office in the first in-
stance, and the courts on review, could have checked the proliferation of
patent rights. But the Patent Office has a bureaucratic stake in a liberal
patent policy-the greater the number of patent applications on file and of
patents granted, the longer its civil service list. Naturally the Patent Office
welcomes all grist to the patent mill. Naturally, too, the longer the list of
"patent numbers" and "patents pending" that a company can stamp or print
on each of its products, the more effectively it can frighten off easily in-
timidated competitors. 15 Hence "supply" and "demand" for patents are both
under inflationary pressure. The channels of trade are consequently cluttered
with a multitude of extremely dubious patent claims, many of which repre-
sent invention only by a great stretch of the imagination.
16
In the fifty year; from' 1890 to 1940, the annual average number of
patents issued increased progressively from decade to decade. The rate of
issuance in the 1930's--48,520 a year-was more than double the rate in
the 1890's, as the following annual averages per decade show :17
14. Great Britain specifically excludes from patent privileges "substances ... intended
for food or medicine." See CrD. No. 7206 at 21 (1947).
15. For a patentee to obtain protection of a patented article, the statutes require
him so to mark it plainly, giving the number and date of each patent involved. But the
law does not require differentiation between patents for invention and design patents.
Only by a search of Patent Office records can a person tell whether it is the ornamental
design on a patented product or its structure that cannot be copied without risk of a suit
for infringement. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 49 (1940).
16. See. for example, the testimony of James McEvoy. head of the patent department
of General Motors Corporation, in the TNEC Hearings, where he illustrated "a perfectly
silly patent" and declared " . . . there are thousands and thousands of patents just like
that ... Of course, I think that most patents like that are utterly invalid." On the reasons
for this situation, he said, "I think one difficulty, sir, in the Patent Office is the pressure
that they are under to get out patents .... I understand in a great many divisions the
head of the division has given orders to the men that they have to get out so many tatents
every week ... and in many cases there is no proper investigation, sometimes no investi-
gation whatever." "Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power," Hearings '?efore
the Temporary National Economic Committee, pt. 2, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 369-70 (1939).
[Hereafter these hearings will be cited as TNEC Hearings.] For a collection of "silly
patents," see BRoWN AND JEsscor, BEWARE OF IMITATIONS (1932).
17. Data taken from the Index of Patents, issued annually by the United States Patent
Office, Department of Commerce. They cover not only patents for inventions but also
design patents, plant patents (since 1931), and reissues. Data for 1947 show how total
issues are currently distributed among these four categories: inventions, 20,149; designs,
2,102; reissues, 130; plants 52.
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Even after making allowance for the growth of population, the rate of issu-
ance increased nearly 20 per cent between the decade of the 1890's and the
decade of the 1930's. On annual average, patents issued per million of







That the increase is more a reflection of judicial and administrative
policy than of the rate of technological advance is suggested by the sharp
decline since 1940. In 1947 only 22,423 patents were granted, less than half
the number issued in 1939. This decline apparently reflects the response
of the Patent Office to the increasingly vigilant scrutiny of patents by the
courts in recent years whenever they have had an opportunity to rule on
patent validity.18
The multiplicity of patents and the large proportion of patents issued
on trivial, often worthless, innovations 19 obstruct enterprise and hinder com-
petition in several ways. They lengthen and complicate the search to find
out whether a particular technique or product feature is within the public
domain or a possible infringement of a valid patent. Thus they increase
the overhead costs-and the risks--of every manufacturing enterprise.
They also make more costly the litigation necessary to settle patent claims,
even when there is an honest difference of opinion. New and small-scale
enterprises in particular seldom have funds to expend in legal contests
that, by delaying tactics, can be prolonged for three, five, seven years or
18. For surveys of the results of patent litigation before and after the radical change
during the 1930's in the views of the Supreme Court on the question of patentable in-
vention, see Kenyon, Sore Spots in the Patent System, 24 J. OF PATENT OFFICE Soc. 458,
469 (1942) ; Cole, Patent Law Trends, 26 J. OF PATENT OFFICE Soc. 233, 252-55 (1944).
Whereas from 1900 to 1930, the Supreme Court invalidated 35 out of 62, or 56.6% of
the patents challenged in cases reaching that tribunal, from 1930 to 1943 it invalidated
30 out of 37, or 81%. Cole found a similar trend, though with a lag, in the decisions on
patents by lower federal courts. Loc. cit. supra.
19. The late Frederick P. Fish, former president of American Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., general counsel of United Shoe Machinery Co., and a leading member of the
patent bar, testified that "My personal view is that not one patented invention in ten is
worth making." Hearings before the Committee on Patents on H.R. 5011, 5012 and 7010,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1919).
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more.20 Such firms usually find it more profitable to capitulate and negotiate
a license or accept a trade agreement that will give them an assured, though
minor, position in the market in return for ending competition.2 '
On the other hand, in some industries large and small firms alike have
tried to rid themselves of the nuisance and expense of continual patent
litigation and negotiation by reciprocal, royalty-free cross-licensing agree-
ments. But as the automobile industry has found, to try to by-pass the
patent system in this way and free a developing technology from its restric-
tions cannot eliminate heavy expense for "patent protection." Such cross-
licensing arrangements are not wholly successful, because they leave the
manufacturers exposed to a steady barrage of shake-down demands by out-
siders who collect patents and patent applications for this specific purpose.
Since the contents of patent applications are secret, and it is so easy to get
patents even on meretricious claims, these tactics are hard to combat. After
describing the experience of the Ford Motor Company in this connection
its patent counsel declared, in response to the question whether he thought
the patent law served a useful purpose: ". . . we feel at times that, viewing
the matter from the standpoint of being made the defendant in all sorts
of harassing litigations, our general feeling is that the system has got to
the point where the tail is wagging the dog, and that it isn't acting 100 per
cent to promote progress, but in many instances is used to impede progress." 22
ABUSES OF PROCEDURE
In procedural matters, also, the patent system, as it has actually oper-
ated, has helped to throttle competition and frustrate the advancement of
"useful Arts." An astute patentee can prolong the legal monopoly in an
invention far beyond the 17-year term of the patent itself simply by keeping the
application "alive" for many years in the Patent Office. The law permits
an applicant to file amendments to his claims, to divide applications in
which the claims cover more than a single invention, and to take three
months, if he chooses, to revise an application in response to objections of
Patent Office examiners.
By judiciously stringing out a series of such formal changes, some of
20. For example, the Aluminum Company of America liquidated the Cowles Bros.
enterprise after ten years of patent litigation. Even though the Cowles' patents were
eventually upheld and their process found not to infringe Alcoa's patents, the drain on
their resources was too great for them to continue competition. They became discouraged
and sold out. See STOCKING AND WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTIoN 221-22 (1946).
The United Shoe Machinery Company affords another classic example of how a giant
industrial consolidation can tie up and wear down competitors by patent infringement
litigation. For a discussion of United Shoe Machinery's tactics that have enabled it to
reverse the roles of Gulliver and the Lilliputians in the fable, see HAMILTON, PATENTS
AND FREE ENTERPRISE 59-60 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
21. See cases discussed in later pages of this article, in particular the glass container,
wall-board, salt, gypsum and electric circuit breaker monopolies.
22. TNEC Hearings, pt. 2, 279; see also pp. 256-376.
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which could and should have been afnticipated while others may be quite
inconsequential, the applicant may keep the essential "invention"-if there
is one--out of the public domain almost indefinitely. In one instance, an
inventor succeeded in maintaining an exclusive right in his novel device
for 53 years-for sound-recording on films.2 3 Moreover a "slumbering"
application in the Patent Office can be used, if drafted in broad and nebulous
terms, as a convenient sponge for absorbing new developments in the indus-
trial art as they unfold, from whatever quarter those developments may
come.24 And such pending applications can be used most effectively, as expe-




The procedure technically known as an "interference" aggravates the
evils of delay in completing patent applications. When the Patent Office
receives two or more applications covering substantially the same invention
it declares them in interference, sets a date for a hearing, and requires the
applicants to submit evidence in support of their respective claims to priority.
23. Patent No. 1,203,190 issued to one Fritts in 1916 after the application had been
pending 36 years. The Patent Office itself computed the permissible term of protection
under the rules in force in 1938 as 44 years. See testimony of the Commissioner of
Patents, TNEC Hearings, pt. 3, pp. 860 and 1133.
24. See testimony of G. H. Willitts, a patent attorney and secretary of "a group
of 50 large manufacturing concerns," in Hearings before the Committee on Patents on
H.R. General Revision of the Patent Laws, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 69-72 (1932) : "There
is another angle of the long-pending case that is particularly grievous. . . There are
some companies that carry patent practice to extremes, and one of their favorite
stratagems is this: They file large numbers of patent applications; they keep them in the
Patent Office as long as they can-perhaps they are already established in their field....
They are afraid a competitor may come along with something just as good. . . .As a
competitor comes out with a new machine . . . they look through all their pending
applications, which may run into several thousand, and see if they can't find some
similarity, no matter how far-fetched, but some similarity between the 6ompetitive
machine and this matter that is in the pending application, then they will write claims
into the pending application covering this competitor's machine, and in a short time
come out with a patent, make charges of infringement, and bring suit. That is not
accidental. It is a policy of certain companies. . . . Now, that thing has happened to
industry after industry. . . . [Tlhese difficulties . . . have affected . . . most of the
major industries in the United States. ... You are led into a trap . . . and then the
trap is sprung on you."
25. Mr. H. R. Smith, secretary-treasurer and later president of Hartford-Empire,
the patent-holding company dominating the glass container industry, succinctly and
frankly described the patent policy of his company as follows:
"In taking out patents we have three main purposes-
"(a) To cover the actual machines which we are putting out and prevent duplica-
tion of them....
"(b) To block the development of machines which might be constructed by others
... using alternative means...
"(c) To secure patents on possible improvements of competing machines so as to
'fence in' those and prevent their reaching an improved stage." United States v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541, 611-12 (N.D. Ohio 1942).
In carrying out this policy the company found it convenient to acquire licensing
control over more than a thousand patents, 717 of which it owned outright. See id. at
618; and TNEC Hearings, pt. 2, p. 380.
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The examiners who conduct the hearings possess no powers to subpoena
witnesses and demand that specific documents be submitted for the record.
The evidence offered customarily consists of ex parte depositions. The con-
testants not appearing in person, the examiner has no alternative but to
assume their veracity. In any case, the proceedings afford no opportunity
for a public prosecutor to examine or cross-examine witnesses tinder oath;
the public interest, lacking a champion, goes by default.
Not only are interference proceedings costly and long drawn out, fre-
quently lasting three or four years or longer,26 but their very nature encour-
ages fraud and collusion.27 The Commissioner of Patents himself testified
as follows in 1939:
"There is no question that the interference procedure has been greatly abused and
that in some instances it has been invoked for unworthy purposes, as, for example, to
delay a competitor's application in the Patent Office. . . .it is the unanimous opinion
of the officials of the Patent Office and virtually the consensus of the patent bar and
the public that the interference practice should be reformed." ."
Nine years later it remained, nevertheless, essentially unchanged, despite
minor improvements introduced in 1940 to overcome obstructive delays.
THE ABusE OF "REIssuEs"
Another procedural abuse that has helped business erect patent barri-
cades against competition is the enlargement of the scope of "reissues"-
in nontechnical terms, amended patents. On application, the Patent Office
may substitute for an outstanding patent another running for the same
period but with modified claims.
In authorizing reissues Congress expressly limited the privilege to the
26. Hamilton states that the average pendency of interference proceedings in the
Patent Office is three years, and of those that are carried into court, four and a half years.
HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 128 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941). On the
costliness of interference practice and the handicap it imposes on small concerns trying
to compete with companies that command "large resources," see the testimony of Dr.
Vannevar Bush, TNEC Hearings, pt. 3, p. 880. The "large resources" to which Dr. Bush
referred were financial resources, of course-not technical resources.
27. For an exceptionally noisome example in confirmation of this statement, see
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mqch. Co., 324 U S. 806.
65 Sup. Ct. 993, 89 L. Ed. 1381 (1945). The Supreme Court directed the dismissal of
Automotive's suit for infringement because, though it was the owner of a valid patent,
it had connived with its competitor, Precision, to settle an interference proceeding
involving a patent application by one of Precision's founders after it had learned that
that application was founded on fraud and perjury. By negotiating a settlement, Auto-
motive obtained a patent on the perjured .application and thus fortified its hold on the
market. At the same time it granted Precision a license, allotting its unscrupulous
competitor a small share of the market, and got a promise from that company never to
question the validity of any Automotive patent-not even the one that both parties knew
wAs tainted with fraud. Precision's perfidy in disregarding its license restrictions was the
occasion for the instant suit. But because Automotive did not come into court "with
clean hands," the court declared "That the actions of ... Precision may have been
more reprehensible is immaterial." 324 U.S. at 819.
28. TNEC Hearings, pt. 3, p. 861.
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correction of mistakes. In practice, however, the Patent Office and the
courts permitted patentees not only to disclaim some elements of the alleged
invention, and thus save "claims" stated in such broad terms that a court
would probably hold them invalid, but also to add new elements to the
claimed invention.
29
As in the case of the amendment of applications, reissues may bring
under patent protection features of the general advance in the industrial
arts that might not themselves amount to patentable invention and for which,
in any event, the patentee may not be primarily responsible. In this way,
an alert and aggressive corporation can fortify its patent position and con-
tinually reinforce its dominance of the market.
INFRINGEMrENT SUITS
The most effective weapon in the patents arsenal for harassing com-
petitors and thwarting the development of new rivals is the infringement
suit.30 A large company with a formidable collection of patents and ample
financial resources can impose an insupportable burden on a small enter-
prise by forcing it to defend its right to use techniques or to manufacture
products that, as it eventually turns out, may be entirely in the public domain.
Even the most scrupulous care to avoid invasion of existing patent rights
cannot render the small company immune from infringement litigation. For
it costs as much-if not more-to defend an infringement suit as to prose-
cute it. A small competitor can stand the financial strain only so long before
it succumbs to its more powerful rival.
Even though the principal issue may be whether the government im-
29. See, e.g., Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 12 Sup. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658 (1892) ;
Corbin Cabinet Lock Co. v. Eagle Lock Co., 150 U.S. 38, 14 Sup. Ct. 28, 37 L. Ed. 989
(1893); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Aluminum Stopper Co., 108 Fed. 845 (4th Cir.
1901) ; and Perfection Bed Co. v. Murphy Bed Co., 266 Fed. 698 (9th Cir. 1920), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 652 (1920).
The more vigilant scrutiny that the Supreme Court has given to Patent Office
procedure and to patent restrictions generally in recent years has narrowed greatly the
permissible changes in patent specifications and claims on reissue. See, for example,
U.S. Industrial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 62
Sup. Ct. 839, 86 L. Ed. 1105 (1942), reversing 121 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1941).
30. As Fortune magazine described it: "The most versatile of all devices . . . is the
infringement suit, one of the most expensive forms of litigation. The infringement suit
can be used not only as a simple legal action to stop someone from stealing your in-
vention, but also as a controlling device with a wide range of action all the way from
the veiled threat to the punitive war. A. competing product, process, or machine is
challenged.... If both patents and the patent-owning corporations seem to be of equal
weight, the dispute is likely to be settled out of court with a cross-licensing agreement
between the two. If the challenged company is fairly small, but its patent sound, it is
likely to be forced, in lieu of incurring . . . [heavy] expense . . . , to accept a license
under the challenger's patent setting rigid price and production limits. This may continue
... all the way out to an open reign of terror not only against the alleged infringer but
against all of his customers. . . . More time, money, and energy have sometimes gone
into this kind of warfare than ever went into the original technological development."
From War and Peace and the Patent System, 26 FORTUNE [No. 2] 103, 105, 132 (Aug.
1942).
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providently granted the patent, and even though the benefits of successful
defense accrue to the public, a private business must bear the entire cost
of defending an infringement suit. In this way the patent system plays into
the hands of monopolies. It also imposes a one-sided and unfair handicap
on competitive enterprises by obliging them, at their own expense, to defend
the public interest in keeping an advancing technology open to common use-
except for exclusive rights in bona fide inventions. If an inventor himself,
or an alleged infringer, could obtain at public expense a judicial determina-
tion of the validity of any of the thousands of patents issued almost promis-
cuously by the Patent Office, it would deprive monopolies founded on patents
of much of their power to perpetuate themselves.
A company which sedulously uses patents to strengthen its monopoly
may fear to challenge an upstart competitor directly, lest some or all of the
patents allegedly infringed be held invalid. But in that case it can proceed
indirectly, with less risk, by threatening the competitor's customers with
suits for contributory infringement. Seldom will customers regard continued
commercial relations with a particular supplier so important as to make it
worth while for them to contest such a challenge. 3' Thus, the patentee-
monopolist can, in effect, create a boycott against a fledgling rival. At the
same time it can keep intact its imposing array of letters patent, even though
these may amount to nothing more than a paper facade, and it can use them
later against new rivals.
LICENSING AIDS MONOPOLY
If multiplicity of patents and procedural loopholes have indirectly facil-
itated the use of patents to stifle competition, the broadscope of licensing
privileges has directly and substantially helped attain the same end. The
power of a patentee to assign his "exclusive rights" to others rests on explicit
statutory authorization, and the courts have construed the patent grant as in
the nature of a property right.32 And, as an incident of such a right, they
31. In practice. the customer ordinarily takes the precaution of stipulating that his
equipment supplier must defend contributory infringement suits brought against him if
there is any question of conflicting patent rights. But when, as not infrequently happens,
the customer also buys or leases some of his equipment from the dominant patent-holding
company with which the independent is trying to compete, the defense of invalidity of the
patents allegedly infringed may be blocked. The customer's renunciation of any right to
challenge the validity of such patents may foreclose the independent's best defense. The
Hartford-Empire Company used this strategy to cripple its smaller rivals. In this way
it eventually eliminated Amsler-Morton from the annealing oven business in the glass
industry. For details, see text infra. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has severely
limited the enforceability of covenants not to contest the validity of patents. See Sola
Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 Sup. Ct. 172, 87 L. Ed. 165
(1942) ; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 66 Sup. Ct. 101, 90 L. Ed.
47 (1945) ; Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 394, 67 Sup. Ct. 416,
91 L. Ed. 374 (1947); and MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
402, 67 Sup. Ct. 421, 91 L. Ed. 380 (1947). But cf. American Cutting Alloys, Inc. v.
General Electric Co., 135 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1943).
32. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425, 28
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have accorded the patentee the privilege of splitting up "his patent through
license contracts, pretty much as he may choose.
In virtual disregard of the origin of the grant as a government fran-
chise 3 3 and of its strictly defined constitutional purpose, judicial opinion in
patent cases has stretched to the limits of a barren logomachy the doctrine
that "a man can do with his own as he likes." 34 Corollaries of this doctrine
have been the doctrines that a patentee could suppress his invention alto-
gether if he wished,35 and that, because in his discretion he could refuse
to grant licenses under the patent, the patentee could impose such conditions
on licensees as he might think fitting.
36
The discretionary power of patentees to restrict the use of inventions
and to control the business policies of licensees has not always been allowed.
It was a distinctive feature of the development of patent law in the fifty
years after 1890.37 But even during this period, when the licensing privilege
gave a patentee almost complete immunity from the law forbidding "mo-
nopolizing," the courts now and then hesitated to go to the full extreme in
applying the doctrine. In 1911 the Supreme Court held a patent-licensing
scheme for controlling the output and price of sanitary pottery ware a viola-
Sup. Ct. 748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (1908), where the Court states " . . . patents are property,
and entitled to the same rights and sanctions as other property." This dictum ignores,
incidentally, the numerous and widely differing limitations that both common and
statutory law impose on the use and disposition of different kinds of private property.
See, also, for a more recent case in the same vein, General Talking Pictures Corp.
v. Western Electric, 304 U.S. 175, 58 Sup. Ct. 849, 82 L. Ed. 1273 (1938), opinion on
rehearing, 305 U.S. 124, 59 Sup. Ct. 116, 83 L. Ed. 81 (1938). Cf. Special Equipment Co.
v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382, 65 Sup. Ct. 741, 89 L. Ed. 1006 (1945) : "It is a mistake there-
fore to conceive of a patent as but another form of private property. The patent is a
privilege 'conditioned by a public purpose.' Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Ca., 320 U.S.
661, 666 [1944]." (Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas.)
33. The public franchise conception of a patent had its clearest and most forceful
judicial enunciation in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539, 549, 14 L. Ed. 532 (U.S.
1852). It began to lose ground in favor of the private property concept in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. E.g., March v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U.S. 605,
608, 9 Sup. Ct. 168, 32 L. Ed. 538 (1888). For a half century after 1890, or until its
renascence in Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed.
363 (1942) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 Sup. Ct.
268, 88 L. Ed. 376 (1944) ; and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
320 U.S. 680, 64 Sup. Ct. 278, 88 L. Ed. 396 (1944), judicial opinions show only slight
traces of it. Cf. Rich, Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. OF PATENT
Op vic Soc. 85, 88 (1942), where he says that the patent law "went on a spree from
1896 to 1917." But if Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co.. 243 U.S.
502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416, 61 L. Ed. 871 (1917), ended the "spree," it did not eliminate a
"hang-over." See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct.
192, 71 L. Ed. 362 (1926) and the General Talking Pictures case (1938), supra note 32.
34. Cf. HAMILTON, PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE 57-64 (TNEC Monograph 31,
1941).
35. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 28 Sup. Ct.
748, 52 L. Ed. 1122 (1908).
36. Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (No. 2), 213 U.S. 325, 29
Sup. Ct. 503, 53 L. Ed. 816 (1909); and Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 Sup.
Ct. 364, 56 L. Ed. 645 (1912).
37. The outstanding cases that exhibit the evolution of the idea of patent-licensing
freedom are Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 Fed. 288
(6th Cir. 1896) ; Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747, 46 L. Ed.
1058 (1902); and the Leeds & Catlin and A. B. Dick cases, supra note 36, and the
General Electric case, supra note 33.
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tion of the antitrust law. 38 It interpreted the scheme as practically a fraud
on the public. Also, the Court sometimes back-tracked from an advanced
position on patent-licensing freedom. Five years after it approved, in the
A. B. Dick case, a restriction imposed by a patentee on the commercial source
of unpatented materials to be used in the patented device, it withdrew that
approval in the Motion Picture Patents case.3 9
Nevertheless the courts continued in general to look with tolerance, if
not complacency, on the tactics of patentees in drafting license contracts so
as to fortify and even extend their monopoly privileges. As late as 1926 the
Supreme Court could find nothing to condemn in General Electric's patent-
licensing policy that limited the output of its licensees and required them to
sell at prices indentical with its own.
40
Such a broad licensing privilege was an open invitation to use patents
to establish unified, arbitrary control over entire branches of industry. If
a producer, holding, it might be, some strategic patent, could persuade or
coerce other producers to accept licenses, every member of the group could
be lawfully bound to pursue a common price and production policy. In fact
the law as interpreted permitted such a scheme to go farther and divide whole
branches of industry, assigning to each licensee a designated field. In the
General Talking Pictures case the Supreme Court upheld the right of a
licensor to restrict the uses to which either a licensee to manufacture or his
vendees might put the patented device. Stated thus, abstractly, the proposition
may appear quite innocuous. But its concrete application disclosed its oppres-
siveness.
The actual licensor in the General Talking Pictures case was Western
Electric, a subsidiary of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). AT&T
in turn was a member along with Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and
General Electric (GE) of the electronics pool. 41 The real meaning of the
General Talking Pictures case was, therefore, that it sanctioned the allocation
of fields among these three giants. At any rate, it gave judicial blessing to an
arrangement whereby one member of the group (AT&T) reserved to itself
the trade in radio tubes (amplifiers) for use in sound reproduction equipment
38. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9, 57 L. Ed.
107 (1912). Although this decision did not expressly overrule the Benent case, much the
same elements that the Court condemned in the Standard Sanitary case it had earlier
sanctioned in the Bentent case.
39. Supra note 33. The opinion in this case expressly repudiated the A. B. Dick
ruling.
40. And as late as 1936 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a
provision of a patent license, uniform for the several manufacturing licensees, requiring
them to sell at a price fixed by the licensor patent-holding company unpatented products
made on a patented machine. Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co., 82 F.2d
245 (2d Cir. 1936), affirmfing 10 F. Supp. 171 (W.D.N.Y. 1935).
41. On the structure and status of the electronics pool, see Petro, Patents: Judicial
Developments and Legislative Proposals, 12 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 80 & 352, 372-80 (1945) ;
WALDROP AND BORKIN, TELEVISION: A STRUGGLE FOR POWER (1938) ; and WooD, PATENTS
AND ANTITRUST LAW 128-45 (1942).
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in theaters. The principle of the case would similarly sustain the allotment to
the other members of the pool of other "uses" for, or parts of the trade in,
this patented device.
Two important incidents of the extremely broad licensing privilege were
those permitting a patentee (a) to stipulate that his licensees should under no
circumstances challenge the validity of the patents involved.and (b) to require
reciprocal licensing. The judicial doctrine of estoppel was sometimes invoked
to block any effort of a licensee to attack the validity of the patents under
which he was licensed, even without any express contractual limitation on his
right to set up such a defense in an action for infringement. 42 But it was safer
to bind the licensee not to question a licensor's patent rights than to trust to
invocation of the principle of estoppel.
43
Apparently the legality was never questioned of a patentee's making it
a condition of a license that the licensee reciprocate by granting him a cross-
license under whatever patents the licensee might possess in the same field.
The extension of this assumed right to cover not only a licensee's improvements
in the licensed process but whatever future patents he might acquire in the
same general field was easily made.44 By stipulations of reciprocal licensing,
patentees with a strongly fortified patent position sometimes undertook to
establish prior claims on all patents in a broad field of technology.
THE CASES OF RUBBER AND ELECTRIc LAMPS
When the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey obtained from I. G.
Farbenindustrie an assignment of IG's Buna rubber patents, Standard Oil
submitted to rubber manufacturers a draft of a uniform licensing agreement
that would have made almost impossible the development of any synthetic
rubber technique outside its control. The provisions of the proposed contracts
required each rubber company to license reciprocally to Standard Oil not only
all its existing patents on Buna-type synthetics and all improvement patents
but also whatever patents it might subsequently acquire on alternative processes.
Standard Oil's patent attorney described this provision as follows:
"The agreement as it is now drafted will lead to the centering of all patent rights
of licensees in the hands of licensor, with no outflow of those rights except to customers
of licensor....
All manufacturing patent rights of licensees will help to build up licensor's
42. The leading case is United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310, 25 Sup. Ct.
240, 49 L. Ed. 492 (1905).
43. As mentioned before, the enforceability of such covenants has lately come into
question, particularly since the Sola decision in 1942, supra note 31. But see Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's vigorous protest against this overthrow of a "century-old" precedent, in his
dissenting opinion in Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 366, 63 Sup. Ct. 1115, 87 L. Ed.
1450 (1943).
44. The first clear-cut decision on this issue by a court of final jurisdiction appears
to have been Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 67
Sup. Ct. 610, 91 L. Ed. 563 (1947). The Supreme Court upheld the reciprocal licensing
covenant here involved, but the licensee had an exclusive license.
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dominating position. . . In other words, this is not a cross-licensing agreement,
but one in which patents are piled on patents in the hands of one centralizing
company." 4&
A patent-licensing privilege so broad that it permits the use of one or
a few patents to tie up all other patents in a certain field of technology
obviously promotes domination of whole branches of industry by patent-
holding companiei. By the use of this device a company can perpetuate an
industrial monopoly obtained through the leverage of a 17-year patent grant.
And once it attains a dominant position, it may be less urgent for it to continue
vigorously to subsidize technical research. In practice many such companies
-for example, AT&T, General Electric, United Shoe Machinery, Hartford-
Empire, and du Pont-do persevere in research. A company can achieve the
greatest security if it combines leadership in technological development with
a system of license contracts, whereby the "leader" shares its patents with
smaller companies and requires its licensees continually to reinforce its
dominant patent position by handing over to it control of all advances in that
branch of the industrial arts.
The electric lamp industry illustrates how broad licensing privileges may
retard technological progress by restricting the research efforts of licensees.
In the recent antitrust suit against General Electric the government charged
General Electric's cross-licensing contracts as such had deterred licensees
from expanding research. The court thought this was a matter of conjecture
because the evidence showed that the licensees had in fact spent substantial
sums on research. But it declared that "the vice lies in the clause establishing
a quota on sales of the incandescent lamp. This placed 'B' licensees in such
a position that with their income circumscribed to a given fraction of General
Electric sales, they could not support expenditures necessary to operate
extended research and engineering development projects." 46 The restrictive
influence that cross-licensing provisions have exerted on research has not
been confined to the electric lamp field. As Mr. Justice Reed has said:
"Where two or more patentees with competitive, non-infringing patents combine
them and fix prices on all devices produced under any of the patents, competition is
impeded to a greater degree than where a single patentee fixes prices for his licensees.
The struggle for profit is less acute... The stimulus to seek competitive inventions is
reduced by the mutually advantageous price-fixing arrangement." "
45. "Investigation of the National Defense Program," Hearings before a Special
Committee of the U.S. Senate Pursuant to S. Res. 71, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 11, Ex.
383, p. 4605.
46. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 858 (D.N.J. 1949).
Counsel for Tungsol, a General Electric licensee, expressed the matter this way: " . . .
a lamp licensee had no inducement to develop new inventions if General Electric Company
can freely take whatever they develop." Id. at 857. And a General Electric official ex-
pressed it as follows: "Westinghouse has never done and probably will never do their
real share of the work in these fields. They can't afford to because we would reap three-
fourths of their purely creative work." Ibid.
47. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311, 68 Sup. Ct. 550, 92 L. Ed.
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EVILS OF PATENT ACCUMULATION
The simplest and most obvious way of using patents to suppress competi-
tion is by concentrating in one organization control of all or most of the patents
in a particular field. One method of doing this is for a company to accumulate
as many patents as it can lay hold of, either by assignment from its own re-
search staff or by purchase from outside persons. The accumulation of patents
in the hands of a single company has attained fantastic proportions in some
industries. In the mid-1930's AT&T owned more than 9,000 patents and
held licenses under 6,000 others, General Electric controlled more than 8,000
patents, and United Shoe Machinery more than 6,000.48 Such formidable
aggregations of "exclusive rights" amount in practice to much more than a
17-year grant of monopoly. They tend to assure a perpetual monopoly..
The fallacy that "the whole is only the sum of the parts" has few more
striking demonstrations than here. If Mr. Justice Holmes had been fully aware
of the implications of his own dictum that "the life of the law is experience,
not logic," he could hardly have made the following statement in the first
Shoe Machinery case:
"It is said that from 70 to 40 per cent of all the shoe machinery business was
put into a single hand. . . .But taking it as true, we can see no greater objection
to one company manufacturing 70 per cent of three non-competing groups of
patented machinery collectively used for making a single product than to three corpora-
tions making the same proportion of one group each." "'
With this reasoning the Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of a combina-
tion that brought together the business and patents of four distinct groups of
companies, all making shoe machinery but none producing a complete line.
Yet the monopoly power of the several constituents of United, based on their
respective patent holdings, was certainly increased under the consolidation's
policy of making available to shoe manufacturers any particular type of
machine only on condition that they also lease or purchase United's patented,
and even unpatented, equipment of other types. Under this "full-line forcing"
policy, the patent-monopoly powers of Goodyear, McKay, Consolidated and
Eppler were raised to an industrial monopoly level.50
649 (1948), 1 VAND. L. REv. 664 (italics supplied). See, in general, Thomas, The
Patentee's Dilemma-Is Price Fixing Legal? 4 MIAmi L.Q. 313 (1950).
48. See FCC, TELEPHONE INVESTIGATION (PRoPosED REPORT) 267 (1938); HAMILTON,
PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRIsE 60 (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
49. United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 217, 33 Sup. Ct. 253, 57 L. Ed. 481
(1913). The explanation of Mr. Justice Holmes' reference to three companies instead
of four is that the fourth group of companies was acquired shortly after the organization
of United Sho6 Machinery Corporation. The original combination brought together
the Goodyear companies, the McKay companies, and the Consolidated Shoe Machinery
Company. With the Eppler companies, which came in almost immediately afterward, the
consolidation controlled-and still controls-about 90% of the shoe machinery produced
in the United States. These four groups of companies operated independently before the
merger and their business was competitive to the extent that the lines of machinery
each group manufactured overlapped to some extent the types of machinery one or
more of the other companies produced, as they did in the past.
50. Full-line forcing was outlawed by decree after the passage of the .Clayton Act.
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BARRICADES AGAINST COMPETITION
Multiplicity of patents greatly facilitates the raising of formidable patent
barricades against competition. As Judge Clark tersely put it: "Clearly, in
the multiplicity of patents lies the opportunity for pooling, for unfair coin-
petition, and for in terrorem suppression .... Multiplicity of trivial patents
furnishes the field in which the trust operates." 51
But the ease with which patents may be obtained from the Patent Office
is only one factor contributing to the erection of barricades. Supplementing
it is the ease with which a giant consolidation can buy patents from free-lance
inventors. When a single company controls through patents most of the
equipment used or the different types of products manufactured in a certain
branch of industry, it severely restricts the opportunity of independent in-
ventors to dispose of their inventions, and except in the rare case of a basic
patent it-practically extinguishes their opportunity to exploit them inde-
pendently. The only possible purchaser of patent rights applicable in that field
can in effect dictate the terms on which it will buy them.52 Facing a single
buyer, and that buyer fortified with financial resources far exceeding those at
his own disposal, the independent inventor is under a severe handicap. He has
practically no alternative but to assign his patent, and so he hands it over on
such terms as the single buyer may offer. Of the 715 patents that Hartford-
Empire accumulated prior to 1939, more than half represented assignments
from outside parties.
The continual accumulation by a single dominant company of patents
for new techniques invented by outsiders is in many ways comparable to the
steady absorption of independent producers through mergers. The purchase
of such patents is in one sense tantamount to aqquisition of potential coin-
petitors. Not every patent, of course, affords a practicable basis for new
enterprise. But if, out of the many patents issuing to independent inventors,
those bearing on the technology of a certain industry were beyond the reach
of its dominant patentee, then new inventions would soon make possible
competitive enterprise. The pre-emptive and preclusive rights that a dominant
patentee in fact holds over new technological developments in its field greatly
facilitate indefinite continuance of monopolistic control.
Furthermore, such a combination as United Shoe Machinery eliminates
the incentive each of the constituents would have, as an independent producer,
See United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363, 66 L.
Ed. 708 (1922).
51. From his testimony in "Pooling of Patents," Hearings before Conittce on
Patents on H.R. 4523, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1077-80 (1935).
52. On the handicap that concentration of patent ownership imposes on the
independent inventor, see id. at 1075-76. After quoting corroboratory statements by such
experienced inventors as Edison and Baekeland and such distinguished lawyers as
Brandeis and Fish, Judge Clark said that the aggregation of patents by industrial
monopolies gives them "an unfair advantage in bargaining for patents for improvements"
and "automatically closes the market to outside inventors."
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to "round out" its line of patented techniques or products. The Goodyear
companies, with a special interest in welting machines, would have had a strong
competitive interest had there been no merger, to introduce and perfect a line
of lasting machines that would not infringe the patents on such equipment of
the Consolidated and the Eppler companies. But after the merger United
Shoe Machinery was obliged only to buy up any new technical developments
in lasting machines--or any other type of shoe machinery-that might
threaten its'exclusive control of the industry. And this it apparently has done, as
occasion demanded.5
3
EvILs OF CROss LICENSING
Another method of using patents to block competition is for a group of
companies to pool or cross-license their respective patents, so that all licensees
operate under restrictions mutually arranged. Cross-licensing may be justifiable
in some instances. An invention is seldom the work of one inventor. Usually
many technicians are experimenting in the same field, at the same time, trying
to solve the same problems. Different experimenters working independently
may, and frequently do, simultaneously find different ways of achieving the
same objective. Some features of a device or some steps in a process worked
out by different inventors may be identical. More commonly, one process or
device will supplement another. Each may represent a genuine invention and
so be patentable. If patents are issued in such circumstances one may block
the other: the commercial use of one depends on its exploitation in conjunction
with the other. Cross-licensing enables both patentees, very often, to take
advantage of each other's inventions, while avoiding the expense of infringe-
ment suits. Such was plainly the object of the royalty-free cross-licensing
agreement in the automobile industry and apparently also of that in the
aircraft industry with its provision for arbitration of royalties.
54
Historically, then, the reason for cross-licensing is found in efforts to
overcome reciprocal blockages; and even today it is used in some industries
for a similar purpose: to free a rapidly developing technology from the
trammels of monopoly privileges. But in other industries cross-licensing has
come to serve other purposes. Currently a cross-licensing agreement is often
a result of connivance among a group of competitors to circumvent-legally
-their obligation to avoid restraining trade. The cross-licensed patents may
have no technical interdependence and no one of them may be so important
that its use is indispensable. The main purpose of such cross-licensing agree-
53. But Business Is Always Good, 8 FORTUNE [No. 3] 34 (Sept. 1933); see also
Business at War, 30 FORTUNE [No. 5] 208, 214 (Nov. 1944).
54. For a review of the operation of various cross-licensing agreements, see "Pooling
of Patents," supra note 51 passim. The Committee listed (p. 1145) a score of such
agreements then (1935) in existence having an industry-wide compass.
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ments is not to make technology available: it is to make competitive pricing
and competitive expansion of production impossible.
Before the drastic revision of patent law interpretation wrought by the
New Deal appointees to the Supreme Court, the leading case on patent pooling
was that of the Standard Oil Company (Indiana), decided in 1931.m
Several of the major oil companies had independently developed various
methods of increasing the proportionate output of gasoline from the refining
process by distillation of crude oils under pressure, that is, by r'cracking."
Numerous patents covered these improvements, and though at least some of
them might have been exploited independently the patentees believed that elimi-
nation of competition in their use would facilitate commercial exploitation.
They therefore formed a patent pool. By mutual agreement they fixed royalties
on the several cross-licensed processes, established conditions for license
eligibility, and divided the royalty revenues among the members in predeter-
mined proportions. Primarily on the ground that members of the pool
produced only a small percentage of the entire volume of motor fuel manu-
factured in the United States, so that refiners using the pooled cracking
patents faced effective competition from refiners producing only straight-run
gasoline, the Supreme Court sanctioned the arrangement when the government
assailed it as a violation of the antitrust laws.
COURTS HIT MONOPOLY USE OF PATENTS
In a series of twelve cases beginning in 1939, however, the courts have
consistently outlawed the use of patents to monopolize trade or stifle competi-
tion. The first case in the series involved the same industry and many of the
same defendants as the cracking-patents case. Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey acquired, jointly with General Motors and du Pont, patents on a
tetraethyl lead compound for mixture with gasoline to improve its octane
rating. *The three partners organized Ethyl Gasoline Corporation, which sold
the antiknock fluid to licensed refiners under a restrictive covenant that they
would supply lead-treated gasoline only to Ethyl-licensed jobberp and re-
tailers. Ethyl required its dealer-licensees to sell the gasoline only at prices
fixed by it, and refused licenses to distributors known as price cutters. The
Supreme Court condemned this industry-wide licensing system as a price-
fixing scheme.5"
Two years later, the Court struck down two attempts by patentees to
extend their respective monopolies on patented devices by monopolizing un-
55. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 51 Sup. Ct. 421, 75
L. Ed. 926 (1931).
56. Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 60 Sup. Ct. 618, 84 L. Ed.
852 (1940).
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patented materials used in conjunction therewith.57 In these cases the Court
for the first time took the position that an appropriate remedy for such a
misuse of the patent was judicial withholding of equitable relief for infringe-
ment. This amounted, in effect, to forfeiture of the patents involved.
In the same year, the Court also held illegal two schemes closely com-
parable to that condemned in the Ethyl case. The first case involved a regi-
mentation of the distributive trade under a licensing system, with resale price
restrictions.5 The second case involved a del credere "agency" arrangement
that not only tied up the dealers but also divided the market among the various
hardboard-manufacturing concerns. 59
In 1944, a patent-licensing scheme for uniting under the domination of
a single holding company all manufacturers of thermostatic control devices
met a similar fate.60 The following year witnessed the partial dissolution of
the patent pool in the glass container industry.
6 '
The titanium pigments cartel, in which National Lead and du Pont
played leading roles, cross-licensed their respective patents with foreign
producers, and suppressed all competition in the domestic market, encountered
judicial disapproval in 1947.62 In the same year International Salt's patent-
licensing system ran up against the same legal barrier that the Court had
erected to block a similar arrangement in the Morton Salt case.63 Finally,
in 1948 the Supreme Court applied the ax to two more patent-licensing
schemes that involved combinations among otherwise competitive manu-
facturers mutually to fix prices. The first involved a series of license agree-
ments that after 1937 embraced all manufacturers of gypsum wallboard and
required them to sell at uniform prices. 64 The second arose out of a simple
cross-licensing agreement on drop-out fuse cutouts (for use in electric
circuits) to settle an interference proceeding in the Patent Office and to enable
the patentees to use two mutually inhibitory, or "blocked," patents. But this
cross-licensing agreement lead to a concerted price-fixing arrangement among
all the principal producers. This, said the Court, "is more than an exploitation
57. Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 62 Sup. Ct. 402, 86 L. Ed.
363 (1942) ; and B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 Sup. Ct. 406, 86 L. Ed. 367
(1942).
58. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 62 Sup. Ct. 1088, 86 L. Ed.
1408 (1942).
59. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 62 Sup. Ct. 1070, 86 L. Ed.
1461 (1942).
60. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 Sup. Ct. 268,
88 L. Ed. 376 (1944); and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
320 U.S. 680, 64 Sup. Ct. 278, 88 L. Ed. 396 (1944).
61. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 Sup. Ct. 373, 89 L. Ed.
322 (1945), For a detailed account of this proceeding, see text infra.
62. United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 67 Sup. Ct. 1634, 91 L. Ed.
2077 (1947).
63. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 Sup. Ct. 12, 92 L. Ed.
20 (1947).
64. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 Sup. Ct. 525, 92
L. Ed. 746 (1948).
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of patents. There is the vice that patentees have combined to fix prices on
patented products." 65
Most of these cases involved licensing or cross-licensing arrangements
that went much further than those judicially sustained in the cracking-patents
case, and some even went beyond the limits set down in the General Electric
case. Without exception the license restrictions condemned involved attempts
to fix prices, to limit output or to control channels of distribution. In these
twelve. cases, in other words, the patent-holding groups were trying to push
to its logical extreme the doctrine of the cracking-patents case. The outcome
indicates that the courts have in late years greatly narrowed the scope of
patent-licensing and cross-licensing arrangements. Though the General Electric
and the Standard Oil Company of Indiana decisions have never been over-
ruled, it is at least doubtful that either still represents a valid and binding
precedent.
PATENT ABusEs iN GLASS
The practices of no single company-indeed, the business arrangements of
no single industry-illustrate all the abuses to which the patent system is sub-
ject. Misuse of patents apparently is so widespread and takes so many different
forms that it would require almost a comprehensive survey of American
manufacturing to cover the subject exhaustively. Nevertheless, a single recent
case--concerning the Hartford-Empire Corporation-gives a fairly clear
picture of the concrete circumstances and specific results of various methods
of using patents to restrain trade.66 This case is noteworthy, not only as a
striking example of the consequences of patent abuses in terms of market
65. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 314-15, 68 Sup. Ct. 550, 92 L.
Ed. 701 (1948). The court, with only eight justices sitting, split three ways. Four of the
eight, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, favored explicitly overruling the (;em'ral
-Electric case; but the majority opinion, by Mr. Justice Reed, rejected- that step as un-
necessary. See Schueller, The Newt, Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent
Abuse, 50 COL. L. RFv. 170, 184-95 (1950); Thomas, The Patentee's Dilemma-Is Price
Fixing Legal? 4 MIA-M L.Q. 313 (1950); 1 VAND. L. REv. 664 (1948).
66. United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 1942),
mnodified and aff'd, Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 Sup. Ct. 373,
89 L. Ed. 322 (1945); on the Governments petition for a clarification of the judgment,
directives to the trial court were amended in minor respects, 324 U.S. 570, 65 Sup. Ct.
815, 89 L. Ed. 1198 (1945).
The case began with a complaint filed December 11, 1939. After a trial lasting
112 days and resulting in a printed record running to 16,500 pages, the trial judge gave an
exhaustive summary of the evidence in 628 findings of fact. He also filed 89 conclusions
of law, and the Supreme Court set a modern record by allowing 19,2 hours for argument.
Both courts held that the defendants had clearly violated the antitrust laws. The only
significant difference in their views related to the severity of the penalty to be
imposed. The majority of the Supreme Court refused to sanction the provision of the
lower court's decree requiring royalty-free licensing of defendants' patents. Instead, the
Supreme Court directed the trial court to enter a decree stipulating compulsory licensing
with reasonable royalties. The Supreme Court also directed the trial court to terminate
immediately the involuntary receivership that it had imposed on Hartford-Impire as
a means of insuring compliance with the terms of the decree.
The revision of the District Court's decree in these two important respects en-
countered vigorous dissents from Justices Black and Rutledge.
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control but also as a landmark in the integration of patent law and antitrust
law.
The glass industry is composed of two major parts, organized as distinct
branches of trade. These are the sheet-glass and the glass container industries. 67.
Two companies dominate the sheet-glass industry: Pittsburgh Plate Glass and
Libbey-Owens-Ford. Their operations are closely interlocked through patent
cross-licensing agreements resembling those in the glass container field.68
The glass container branch of the industry manufactures bottles and
bulbs for electric lamps. The Corning Glass Works completely monopolizes
the electric lamp bulb business, and it is also an important producer of such
specialty products as heat-resistant ware and glass tubing.69 In the bottle
field proper five producers practically blanket the field. They are Owens-
Illinois, Hazel-Atlas, Thatcher, Ball Brothers and Anchor-Hocking. These
companies produced in 1937 about 70% of the total domestic output of glass
containers. The 35 other manufacturers in the field were to all intents and
purposes not competitors of the "Big Five." For their output of such staples
as medicine, beer and milk bottles, fruit jars and packer's ware for food
products such as ketchup, meats and coffee was insignificant. Their main trade
consisted of specially shaped bottles for perfumes, soft drinks, hair tonics,
and the like.
Of the "Big Five," Anchor-Hocking, the third largest, appears to have
operated independently; it was early dismissed as a defendant. The other
four were all intimately interconnected through patent license agreements
with Hartford-Empire, which itself manufactured no glassware. The largest
member of the group was Owens-Illinois. Its shipments in 1938 were more
than the combined shipments of the others. In fact, Owens-Illinois shared with
Hartford-Empire virtually a dictatorship of the whole industry.
67. Several other branches of the industry contribute in a small way to the total
output of glass products. The oldest of these minor branches of the industry makes pressed
ware such as table tumblers. Another minor branch makes specialty ware such as optical
lenses, photographic lenses, and ornamental figures. In recent years many new types of
glass ware have appeared on the market such as fibre glass for insulation and glass blocks
for building construction.
On the historical development and the structural peculiarities of the glass industry,
see WATxINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY, c. 8 (1927).
68. In an antitrust complaint, filed on May 23, 1945 and amended March 19, 1946,
the Government charged that these arrangements formed the basis for a cartel in re-
straint of domestic and international trade in plate glass, window glass, and other types
of sheet glass. This case was settled by a consent decree on Sept. 5, 1946. United States v.
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., CCH Trade Cas., 1946-47, 1 57,489 (N.D. Ohio 1946).
69. Most of the data in this section refer to the situation at the end of the 1930's, as
presented in the evidence submitted in the Government's antitrust case against Hartford-
Empire and affiliated manufacturing companies. See note 55 supra. The weakening of
patent controls as a result of that case may eventually bring about some changes in the
relative position of various members of the industry. However, as of the beginning of
1948 sufficient time had not elapsed for any significant alteration in the general picture
to make its appearance. In any event, Corning's quasi-monopoly of electric lamp bulbs
and of heat-resistant ware, marketed under the trade name of Pyrex, was not materially
disturbed by the Hartford-Empire decision.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEII[
This combination dominating the glass container field was the result of
a series of maneuvers directly or indirectly related to the exploitation of patent
privileges.
A SEVEN-POINT MONOPOLY PLAN: HARTFORD-EMPIRE
There were innumerable individual transactions and piecemeal mergers,
all of which fitted into the general plan.70 But to indicate the main lines of
development it will suffice to distinguish seven major steps in its evolution.
These were:
(1) The founding of the Owens Glass Company about 1906 to exploit
Owens' basic invention in automatic glass-bottle-blowing machinery
(2) The negotiation in 1916 of a contract between Hartford and Empire,
a Coming subsidiary, for the concerted exploitation of patents relating to an
independent development in the automatic glass-bottle-blowing art
(3) The consolidation of Hartford and Empire in 1922 and the con-
current agreement dividing the field between Hartford and Corning
(4) The negotiation of an offensive and defensive alliance between
Hartford-Empire and Owens in 1924
(5) The negotiation of tripartite agreement among Hartford-Empire,
Owens, and Hazel-Atlas in 1932
(6) The signing of a contract between the Hartford-Empire--Owens
consortium and Ball Brotliers in 1933
(7) The signing of a contract between the Hartford-Empire-Owens
consortium and Lynch Machinery Company in 1933
The significant details of these events were as follows:
(1) The introduction of automatic glass-bottle-blowing machinery revo-
lutionized a trade that had previously consisted of small shops dependent
on skilled artisans. As a single Owens machine displaced more than a score of
hand "blowers" and "gatherers," a strong centralizing tendency in the organi-
zation of the industry was inevitable. But the tendency was strengthened by
70. For example, Owens-Illinois reached its towering position in part as a result
of mergers with some 13 other glass-container manufacturers at intervals over a period
of 30 years. The largest of these acquisitions was that of the Illinois Glass Company in
1929. One of the principal factors behind all of these mergers was the strong patent
position of the Owens company. In some cases the acquisitions clearly reflected Owens'
desire to strengthen its patent position, but more frequently the company absorbed
probably found its independent position untenable against the steady pressure that Owens
could exert through the exploitation of its accumulated patents.
Another development, besides such piecemeal mergers, that helped to cement the
glass-container industry into a monolithic structure was the organization of the Glass
Container Association. The trial court considered the operations of this trade association
so integrally connected with the patent pool that it listed it as one of the eight major stel)%
in the evolution of the monopoly. 46 F. Supp. at 585. Undoubtedly, as the court found,
the Association acted in the role of a policeman to enforce the license restrictions that
Owens and Hartford-Empire imposed on the rest of the industry. Id. at 588. Nevertheless,
such activities are not necessarily an adjunct of cross-licensing arrangements. Many trade
associa'tions perform comparable functions in respect of stabilization programs that have
no connection with a network of patent cross-licenses.
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Owens' policy of persistent accumulation of improvement patents and the
acquisition of competing plants, some of which had grown to substantial size
by the use of semiautomatic machinery. The basic feature of the Owens in-
vention was a suction-feed device that drew the molten glass into the mold,
where pneumatic pressure "formed" it to the desired shape. The major diffi-
culty in this process was to overcome the tendency of the molten glass to harden
at the point where its flow into the mold was cut off. The original Owens in-
vention left room for many subsequent improvements in this part of the
machinery.
(2) A major step forward in the bottle-blowing art came with
the invention in 1912 of an automatic machine using the gob-feed
process, which differed radically from the Owens process. Instead of drawing
molten glass into the mold by suction out of a continuous stream, the new
process used pneumatic pressure to propel into the mold a previously separated
globule, or gob, of molten glass. Hartford acquired the patent on this process
and made it the basis for promotion of a scheme of industrial control that
ultimately at least matched that of Owens. Coming also acquired some patents
in the gob-feed field, and in 1916 Hartford and Empire reached an agree-
ment for the exchange of rights under their respective patents and the
elimination of competition in their exploitation.
(3) After six years of cooperation under this contract Hartford and
Corning merged their interests in the bottle-machinery field. They formed the
Hartford-Empire Company, in which Corning held 40% of the stock. Hart-
ford-Empire agreed with Corning to stay out of the electric lamp bulb field
in return for Corning's promise to stay out of the bottle field. A Hartford
official told of the goal sought by the merger and accompanying agreement.
He said that "working as one unit properly financed and properly organized,
this unit... would, within reasonable time, dominate the entire glass industry.
" 71
(4) The 1924 contract between Hartford-Empire and Owens brought
under unified control the only commercially workable techniques for the,
automatic production of glass bottles. Owens gave Hartford-Empire an
exclusive license under all of its patents adaptable to gob feeders and forming
machines, with rights to sub-license others. Hartford-Empire gave Owens
a non-exclusive, unrestricted, royalty-free license under its- patents for 40
gob feeder units. This license was the only "unrestricted" license that Hartford-
Empire ever granted.72 Owens retained exclusive control of suction-type
71. 46 F. Supp. at 553.
72. In fact, the license was not wholly unrestricted because, whether by express
provisions of the contract or by mutual understanding, Owens was bound not to use
the Hartford-Empire patents in Corning's field of electric lamp bulb manufacture. For
a summary of the terms of the agreement, see 46 F. Supp. at 549-50 and 564.
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machines.7 3 Additionally, Owens obtained a 50% share in all royalties above
$600,000 annually collected by Hartford-Empire from its licensees. Finally,
Owens obtained veto power over all licenses that Hartford-Empire might nego-
tiate.
7 4
Correspondence among the parties reveals the essential character of this
contract that on its face was simply a cross-licensing agreement. Soon after
the conclusion of the agreement a Hartford-Empire official addressed a letter
to an Owens official saying that he hoped they would "soon have an oppor-
tunity for putting the cards on the table and properly stacking them for use
against our common adversaries." 75
(5) The Hazel-Atlas Glass Company was the second largest bottle
manufacturer in the country. At first it refused to join the Hartford-Empire-
Owens patent-pooling scheme. It possessed some patents of its own on feeder
devices and had applications on file for important improvements. After long,
fruitless negotiations in which Hazel-Atlas showed that it preferred inde-
pendence to submission, Hartford-Empire eventually brought suit for in-
fringement. Hazel-Atlas was convinced that Hartford-Empire had obtained
by fraud the principal patent on which it based the charge of infringement.
Hazel-Atlas hired detectives to trace the origin of certain statements sub-
mitted to the Patent Office in support of the application for this Hartford-
Empire patent, but it could not prove the suspected fraud. Though Hazel-
Atlas obtained a judgment in its favor in one Circuit Court of Appeals in
1932, another Circuit Court of Appeals in the same year held one of Hart-
ford's most important patents valid and infringed by Hazel-Atlas.7
6 Rather
73. The agreement did not mention suction feed patents. But the court found that
"it was the ... understanding of the parties that there would be no undue competition
between the suction and the gob-feed processes and that Owens intended to guard any
invasion of the suction field by anyone, including Hartford." Id. at 549. By a supple-
mental agreement in 1932, Owens obtained an option on all present and future Hartford
patents relating to the suction feed process. Id. at 570.
74. Owens never had occasion to use its veto power, because Hartford-Empire had
the same interest as Owens in rigidly restricting its licensees in order to strengthen the
joint patent monopoly. In 1931 at the urgent solicitation of Hartford, Owens agreed to
cancel this provision of the 1924 agreement (section 22). Hartford's interest in obtaining
an annulment of section 22 was avowedly based on the desire to make the basic 1924
agreement less vulnerable to attack under the antitrust laws.
Cooperation in 1933 between the major partners after Hazel-Atlas joined the
consortium shows that the cancellation of section 22 did not alter Hartford-Empire's
practice of consulting Owens before issuing licenses and obtaining its approval of the
proposed provisions thereof. A Hazel-Atlas official admonished Hartford not to reveal
the influence of its manufacturing partners (Owens and Hazel-Atlas) on its licensing
policy. He said, "It seems to me that when people like the Maywood Glass Company
take up with the Hartford-Empire Company about the extension of licenses, that Hart-
ford should certainly not write them and tell them they are referring it to the glass
companies for decision; that is what they did in this case. This makes a lot of hard
feeling among the competition." 46 F. Supp. at 591.
75. Id. at 611. The "common adversaries" were apparently the remaining inde-
pendents.
76. These decisions were, respectively, Hartford-Empire Co. v. Nivison-Weiskopf
Co., 58 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1932) ; and Hartford-Empire Co. v. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.,
59 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1932). In the former case, Hazel-Atlas was defending a suit for
contributory infringement brought against one of its customers.
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than incur continuing heavy expenses of litigation and risk eventual defeat,
Hazel-Atlas took advantage of its still favorable position to effect a settlement.
By the terms of the agreement Hazel-Atlas obtained a one-third interest in
Hartford-Empire's royalty income above $850,000 a year. At the same time,
Owens agreed to accept a reduction in its share of Hartford's "excess"
royalty income from one-half to one-third. Unlike Owens, however, Hazel-
Atlas was obliged to grant Hartford licenses, with power to sub-license, under
all glass machinery patents it had accumulated or might henceforth acquire.
Again unlike Owens, Hazel-Atlas was obliged to pay Hartford royalties on all
its feeder machines-even though some of these machines at least were Hazel-
Atlas machines constructed before the agreement, independently of Hartford-
Empire patents.
Ten years after this settlement, Hazel-Atlas discovered for the first time
that its suspicions were well grounded regarding the circumstances under
which Hartford-Empire had obtained the principal patent at issue in the
infringement suit that led to the 1932 settlement. It therefore brought suit
to have vacated the 1932 decree adjudging it an infringer. The Supreme Court
upheld Hazel-Atlas's contention and directed the Circuit Court to annul the
patent. 7 Meanwhile the infringement suit had served its purpose. It had
brought Hazel-Atlas into the patent fold and had given the tripartite con-
sortium virtually unrivalled mastery of the industry.
(6) In one special part of the field, however, the dominant group still
faced the competition of a well-entrenched independent. Ball Brothers was
the largest maker of fruit jars, in the manufacture of which they used Owens'
suction-type machines under an exclusive license granted nearly a quarter
century earlier. Fortified by this contract, Ball at first rejected Hartford-
77. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 Sup. Ct. 997,
88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944). Though the court split 5 to 4 on this decision, the minority, for
whom Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion, did not question the appropriateness
of some relief from the 1932 decree in view of the disclosures regarding the disreputable
means by which Hartford-Empire had obtained it-and the patent. The minority simply
sought to have the case sent back to the district court for a more orderly procedure.
For the majority Mr. Justice Black wrote an opinion vehemently denouncing the
tactics Hartford-Empire had employed to subdue the largest independent producer in
the industry. The evidence showed that Hartford-Empire had paid a former president
of the Glass Workers' Union $8,000 to sign an article, which officers and attorneys of
Hartford-Empire and Owens had prepared, representing that the invention in question
was a substantial advancement in the art, and had used this article both in the Patent
Office, to support its application for the patent, and in court, to defend the patent's
validity.
After summarizing the facts, Mr. Justice Black said, "Every element of the fraud
here disclosed demands the exercise of the historic power of equity to set aside fraudu-
lently begotten judgments .... This matter does not concern only private parties. ...
It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institu-
tions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of
society." 332 U.S. at 245, 246.
After this decision disbarment proceedings were instituted against several of the
attorneys representing Hartford-Empire in the 1932 infringement suit and these led to
an order of disbarment. See Marcus, Patents, Antitrust Law and Antitrust Judgments
Through Hartford-Empire, 34 GFo. L.J. 1 (1945).
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Empire's invitation to give up its'suction-machine rights and accept a restricted
share of the market under the gob-feed patents umbrella. Ball took the position
that it had nothing to gain from a nonexclusive Hartford license as long as
Hartford had outstanding four licenses for the manufacture of fruit jars in
unlimited quantities. 78 After some reshuffling of these licenses, including
concessions from Owens and Hazel-Atlas to limit their output of fruit jars,
Ball eventually accepted a Hartford license. The agreement recognized Ball's
paramount position in the fruit jar field, and in return for an agreement to
pay Hartford-Empire stipulated royalties practically guaranteed to Ball a
major share of the market. Moreover, Ball received assurance that in accord-
ance with 'Hartford-Empire's traditional policy no new licenses would be
issued in this special field.
(7) Finally the Lynch Company, the largest independent manufacturer
of glass-making machinery, joined the patent consortium in 1933. By the
terms of a cross-licensing agreement, Lynch received the right to make and
sell forming machines embodying Hartford patents. But Lynch was required
to exact discriminatory terms of buyers other than Hartford licensees. Ac-
cording to the court, "the result of the agreement was that Lynch could sell
no narrow neck forming machines except to persons who had first obtained
a forming machine license from Hartford." 79
The Lynch deal closed the last opportunity for independent bottle manu-
facturers to obtain the more important kinds of glass-making machinery
without paying toll to the patent monopolists. One or two concerns still
manufactured such minor elements in glass-making equipment as the "lehrs,"
or ovens, for tempering the ware. In 1934 a Hartford representative ap-
proached one such manufacturer, the Amsler-Morton Company of Pitts-
burgh, with an offer of a merger. Amsler-Morton was to receive a one-third
interest in the Hartford Empire lehr business. In view of the volume of busi-
ness it had developed in this field, Amsler-Morton considered these terms
too harsh. But the Hartford representative left no doubt that the patent
consortium was in no mood to brook continued competition. "'[I] f you do
not go on with us, you are going to be sued, and continue to be sued until you
are out of business.' He said, 'It is our plan that nobody in the glass industry
is going to be allowed to own one piece of equipment.'" 80
78. Owens, Hazel-Atlas, Knox and General were the four such licensees. The latter
two were eventually eliminated as factors in the negotiation. With the help of Owens and
Hartford, Ball bought out Knox. In return for $100,000 cash, General relinquished its
unlimited fruit jar license and agreed to stay out of the domestic household trade in this
line of products. These transactions were all part of the 1933 deal that brought Ball into
a more precisely defined relation to the glass-container pool. See 46 F. Supp. at 582-84.
79. 46 F. Supp. at 550. In the sequence of processes used in making bottles, "forming"
is the next step after "feeding," i.e., after placing the "gob" of molten glass in the mold.
80. 46 F. Supp. at 599. In explanation of the reference to the ownership of glass-
making equipment, Amsler-Morton sold its lehrs while, as in the case of its other glass-
making equipment, Hartford-Empire only leased its lehrs.
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Amsler-Morton rejected the Hartford offer and rashly elected to try
to continue as an independent manufacturer. Hartford-Empire thereupon
threatened to bring suit against Amsler-Morton's customers, thus avoiding
the risk of having its patents declared invalid in a suit directly against Amsler-
Morton. In one such suit, after the district court had held that the Amsler-
Morton lehr did not infringe any of Hartford's patents, the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment.8 1 Without adequate funds to
continue the fight Amsler-Morton withdrew from the field, its glass-container
equipment business ruined.
IPLICATIONS OF HARTFORD-EMPIRE TACTICS
The ruthless policy that the Hartford-Empire-Owens combination pur-
sued in building up its patent monopoly was not a chance outcome of practical
exigencies or of casual consideration. It was part of a deliberate plan to mo-
nopolize the entire industry. Evidence of this may be found not only in the
combinafion's persistent efforts to eliminate competition 82 and in its steady
accumulation of hundreds of patents in all branches of the glass-making art,
but also in the explicit statement of members of the combination. Thus the
secretary-treasurer of Hartford-Empire outlined the company's policy as
follows:
"It has always been our ambition to obtain patents which related to furnace,
melting and refining, feeding, delivery, forming, automatic handling, carrying, stacking,
and annealing. Conceivably we might lose patent domination of one or more important
links, but still retain practical control of the whole chain by means of control of the
most efficient form of the other links." "'
"Consequently we adopted the policy which we have followed ever since of
restricted licensing. That is to say,
"(a) We licensed the machines only to selected manufacturers of the better type,
refusing many licensees whom we thought would be price-cutters, and
81. Hartford-Empire Co. v. Swindell Bros., 96 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1938), reversing
18 F. Supp. 191 (D.C. Md. 1937). Amsler-Morton was required by contract to defend
this suit. As the trial court in the antitrust action said, "It was limited in its defense
of the suit, because Swindell was under license and lease from Hartford and had agreed
not to contest the validity of Hartford's patents." 46 F. Supp. at 551. On this whole
episode, see TNEC Hearings, pt. 2, pp. 596-602.
82. The instances of absorption or expulsion of competitors mentioned in the text
are merely illustrative of a long list of similar maneuvers. To add only one more example,
when Hartford discovered in 1925 that a rival, Federal, had developed a feeder machine
that was "successful" and "a distinctly different type from those developed by Hartford
and Owens," according to the words of a Hartford official, it paid $1,600,000 to get rid
of this competitive threat.
A Hartford memorandum, analyzing the risk of antitrust prosecution on account
of this transaction, stated: "Of course, the court might order that we transfer the entire
Federal licensing business to some other party and turn over to that party the Federal
patents.... I do not see much danger of having any of these deals upset.. . . If they
are upset, I still believe that by that time we will be in a better position, even with such.
dissolution than we would be otherwise." Quoted by Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting
opinion, Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 437, 65 Sup. Ct. 373, 89 L.
Ed. 322 (1945), to show that the majority's "watering down" of the district court's
decree amounted to a confirmation of the Hartford official's shrewd forecast.
83. 46 F. Supp. at 611.
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"(b) We restricted their fields of manufacture, in each case to certain specific
articles, with the idea of preventing too much competition.
"(c) In order to retain more complete control of the situation, we retained title
to the machines and simply leased them for a definite period of years, usually 8 or 10
years . . . . , S4
The record contains further evidence of the resolute determination of
the chief architects of this "glass house" to control the entire industry. A
1924 Hartford memorandum referring to the basic agreement between Hart-
ford-Empire and Owens declares that "the commercial considerations involved
... are of greater importance than the relative patent values controlled by the
two companies. By 'commercial considerations' is meant the domination of
outside feeders, the stabilization of the industry tending against irresponsible
price-cutting." s
When the antitrust suit reached the Supreme Court that tribunal unani-
mously agreed that the evidence disclosed a clear violation of the law. But the
majority regarded as too severe the terms of the district court's decree and
refused to uphold the provision requiring compulsory, royalty-free licensing
of the formidable array of patents that Hartford-Empire had accumulated
in the course of its long climb to ascendancy in the industry.8 0 The Court
pointed out that the antitrust laws provided specific penalties for violations
thereof and that the specified penalties did not include forfeiture of defendants'
assets otherwise than by way of a cash fine. In the opinion of the majority a
requirement of royalty-free licensing was tantamount to cancellation of the
patents.
In vigorous dissents Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Rutledge de-
nounced the majority's "watering down" of the district court's decree. As
Mr. Justice Rutledge declared after reviewing the facts:
"When the patent-holder so far overreaches his privilege as to intrude upon the
rights of others and the public protected by the antitrust legislation, and does so in
such a way that he cannot further exercise the privilege without also trespassing on
the rights thus protected, either his rights or the other person's and the public's rights
must give way. It is wholly incongruous in such circumstances to say that the privilege
of the trespasser shall be preserved and the rights of all others . . . shall continue to
give way . . . this is substantially what the defendants have sought . . . so inverted
an idea of equity, or of the law, cannot stand . . . The court's major modifications, in
my opinion, emasculate the [district court's] decree." ""
PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAws: How RECONCILE?
As the patent system has actually developed, it has in various ways
furnished legal cover for practices that undermine a competitive economic
84. Id. at 593.
85. Id. at 561.
86. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 65 Sup. Ct. 373, 89 L. Ed.
322 (1945).
87. 323 U.S. at 452-53.
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system. Any governmental grant of exclusive patent rights limits, at least
in the field the franchise covers, freedom of enterprise and competitive regu-
lation of the market. Yet, on a broad reckoning, such grants need not be
incompatible with the rule of competition in the economy as a whole. Public
utility franchises probably help conserve competition in the industries that
depend on the franchise holders for transportation, power or other services.
Similarly, the patent system could be remodelled so that, even under modern
conditions, it would provide an adequate stimulus to technological advance
while at the same time imposing fewer limitations and less severe handicaps
on competitive enterprise than it now does.
In view of the opposition of strong vested interests, such a remodelling
will require a determined, coordinated drive by the three major branches of
government, backed by an informed public opinion. Despite the impressive
line of twelve recent cases in which the Supreme Court has heroically struggled
to adapt the patent system to the needs of a competitive industrial order and
release technology from oppressive restraints, 88 correction of patent abuses
will be a slow process at best unless Congress lends a hand. Since Congress
has sanctioned patent rights, it is for Congress to define the correlative patent
obligations-a logical step that legislatures have taken as a matter of course
in reference to all other franchise holders. Without such legislative definition,
judicial precedents hardened by a century of established usage cannot easily
be overthrown.
Even after the Hartford-Empire, United States Gypsum, and Line
Material cases, it is still questionable whether a single corporation may not
lawfully accumulate a formidable array of patents by buying up every im-
portant invention applicable in a particular industry and by means of restrictive
licenses control the quantity and quality of output, the geographic and industrial
field of sales, and even the prices of most, if not all, producers in that field.8 9
The tendency of the Supreme Court in the past ten years to scrutinize more
closely the standards of invention in use by the Patent Office has plainly had
a salutary effect in reducing the multiplicity of patents, but it will take a long
time to bring administrative practice into conformity with enlightened judicial
conceptions of what constitutes genuine invention.
LEGISLATION NEEDED TO PRESERVE COMPETITION
If the goal of public policy is to preserve competition-to make it effective
88. As Judge Learned Hand has suggested: "perhaps the system is outworn." D. & A.
Chemical Co. v. Mimex, 124 F.2d 986, 990 (2d Cir. 1942).
89. Though the twelve recent cases, supra notes 56-65, represent a radical change in
patent law, all of them, except those involving restriction on the use of unpatented
materials in or with patented devices, turned on the issue of conspiracy. In the two
most recent cases decided in March 1948, for example, the decisive factor was the con-
certed action among a group of competing manufacturers, both licensors and licensees.
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-a prompt and thorough legislative reconsideration of the patent problem
appears essential. Otherwise relief from patent abuses may be too little and
too late. The increasing demand for patent reform in recent years provides
a good omen for early action in this direction. The Temporary National
Economic Committee placed revision of the patent laws in the forefront of
its recommendations, and in response thereto Congress adopted four minor
amendments to accelerate Patent Office procedure. 90 Shortly thereafter, on
December 12, 1941, President Roosevelt appointed a National Patent Planning
Commission. This Commission could find little to criticize in the American
patent system, which it considered "the best in the world." 91 Its only signifi-
cant recommendations were (1) establishment of a single Court of Patent
Appeals and (2) a requirement that patent agreements be filed in the Patent
Office.
Congress was not satisfied that these measures touched the heart of the
problem. After extensive hearings on technological mobilization before the
Senate (Bone) Committee on Patents and the (Kilgore) Subcommittee on
War Mobilization of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, Senator Kilgore
and others in 1945 and 1946 introduced five bills having as their main object
the release of technology from stifling restraints founded on patent abuses.9 2
These bills, together with the proposals put forward by Dr. Vannevar Bush,
head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, in his report to
the President in July 1945, Science: The Endless Frontier, formed the basis
for the projected National Science Foundation.93
The major thrust of the congressional program has been toward sub-
sidizing scientific research with public funds. The sponsors of the program
have not squarely faced the issue of the impact of such subsidized research on
the patent system. Agitation for direct reform of the patent system has con-
tinued, however, and in April 1945 the President appointed an interdepart-
90. 34 U.S.C.A., §§ 52, 57, 59a and 63 (1940). See TNEC, "Final Report and Recoin-
mendations," SEN. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 36-37 (1941).
91. Report of the National Planning Commission, "The American Patent System,"
H. R. Doc. No. 239, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943).
92. See "Scientific Research," SEN. Doc. No. 92, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945);
SEN. REP. No. 1136, pt. 2, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); and "Science Legislation,"
Appendix to Report of the Subcommittee on War Mobilization to the (Sen.) Committee
on Military Affairs, Subcommittee Monograph No. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
93. See "National Science Foundation," Report to Accompany S. 526, SEN. REP.
No. 78, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Though Congress passed the National Science
Foundation Act, the President vetoed it in September 1947. In preparation for the con-
templated establishment of the Foundation, whenever the Executive and the Congress
can agree on a suitable administrative plan, the President appointed a Science Research
Board in 1947. Its report, Science and Public Policy, in 5 volumes, was published in 1947.
About the same time, on request of the President, the Attorney General undertook an
investigation of Government Patent Practices and Policies. See Report and Recom-
mendations of the Attorney General to the President (under above title), 3 volumes,
Washington, 1947. This report was confined, except for certain monographic studies in
Volume 3, to policies and procedures of various governmental agencies in relation to
patents.
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mental Patent Survey Committee. 94 If this committee can avoid falling into
the rut that made the work of the National Patent Planning Commission an
exercise in futility, it has a rare opportunity to prepare the way for a re-
modelling of the patent system that will bring it into greater harmony with
the objectives of antitrust policy.
SUcGGESTIONS FOR REvISION OF PATENT LAWS
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore possible ways to recon-
struct the whole framework of the American patent system in order to make
it a more efficient instrument for achieving the constitutional objective of
promoting "the Progress of ... useful Arts." But it will be useful to canvass
briefly less drastic remedies for making the patent system less of a hindrance to
the competitive process of industrial regulation. A convenient procedure will
be to follow the outline of patent abuses already considered.
To abate patent multiplicity two measures immediately suggest them-
selves. The first is to raise the standard of patentable invention. Recent
Supreme Court cases indicate clearly how Congress could make a beginning
in this needed reform.90 The Court has increasingly emphasized that to be
patentable an invention must be not only "new and useful" but must exhibit
a degree of novelty that rises higher than merely skillful adaptation, and a
degree of utility that amounts to more than commercial profitability. Were
Congress to lay down the rule that a patentable invention must represent a
genuine technological advance, it would materially help the Supreme Court
in its efforts to raise the standard of inventions.9 6
A second way to abate the evils of patent multiplicity would be to eliminate
food and medicine from patentable subject matter. In the interest of public
health and nutrition it is anomalous still to permit private corporations to
monopolize such products. Patent medicines are an anachronism, peculiar to
the United States. In Ehgland, as already noted, the public is not dependent
on the chance error of a patentee in overstating his claims to achieve freedom
of access to health-building vitamins. 97 Monopoly profits are surely an un-
94. See the chairman's statement of the problem, Davis, Proposed Modifications in
the Patent System, 12 LAW & CON.TMP. PROB. 796 (1947).
95. See, for example, the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Cuno Engineering Co.
v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-92, 62 Sup. Ct. 37, 86 L. Ed. 58 (1941) ; the
opinion of Mr. Justice Murphy in Dow Chemical Co. v. Halliburton, 324 U.S. 320,
328-29, 65 Sup. Ct. 647, 89 L. Ed. 973 (1945) ; the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in
Sinclair & Carrol Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 335, 65 Sup. Ct. 1143, 89
L. Ed. 1644 (1945) ; and the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 68 Sup. Ct. 440, 92 L. Ed. 588 (1948).
96. See Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEIMP. PROB. 664-67
(1947).
97. Referring to Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Founda-
tion, 146 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945). See in this con-
nection, Federal Trade Commission Order No. 5070, entered March 30, 1948, against
American Dietaids Company directing the respondent to cease and desist from false and
misleading advertising of its patent medicine, "Enrich," a vitamin preparation.
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necessary incentive for the experimental research leading to genuine advances
in medical science. To permit commercial groups to derive monopoly profits
from such research appears contrary to the public interest.
PROCEDURAL REFORMS
Of the many procedural reforms that would improve the patent system,
three are noteworthy. The first is to make applications a matter of public
record and to forbid reissues. The second is to provide for the intervention of a
disinterested public agency or official in interference proceedings. If this can
be accomplished only by transferring interference proceedings to the courts,
perhaps to a special patent court, Congress might well consider doing so.
The record reviewed in this article plainly shows that in one way or
another the public interest must have a defender in the settlement of a contest
over priority of invention between two private parties if the channels of trade
are not to be cluttered with a large number of invalid patents. The opportunity
for fraud and the invitation to collusion under the existing procedure en-
courage the parties to sink their differences and share the spoils.
Finally, Congress might well consider the advantages of a measure for
promptly establishing the validity of patents by judicial process at public
expense. No good reason has been advanced for throwing upon independent
competitors the burden of determining whether the Patent Office has im-
providently taken out of the public domain some technique that rightfully
belongs there and given the exclusive right to use it to a private monopolist.09
One way to accomplish this end would be to empower the Department of
Justice, either on its own initiative or at the request of an inventor or of any
enterprise threatened by an infringement suit, to institute actions in the courts
to test the validity of patents.
To meet patent-licensing abuses Congress could make a significant begin-
ning, at least, by heeding the dissenting opinions in recent Supreme Court
cases. It is not apparent that any advantages attend awaiting some possible
change in the personnel of the Bench or in the opinion of one or two of its
present members to clear up the present muddled situation about the extent
of a patentee's licensing power. It is the responsibility of Congress, as the
supreme lawmaking body, definitely to settle such an issue, for example, as
that of whether a patentee. is entitled, entirely apart from questions of
collusion or conspiracy, to restrict by license agreement the output and prices,
or the market territories, of his licensees.
Beyond this, Congress might well consider the relief of competitive
industry from oppressive licensing policies by providing for compulsory
98. Consult in this connection the penetrating and perspicacious article by Wood-
ward, A Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Admihistrative Law,
55 HAuv. L. REv. 950, 977 (1942).
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licensing on payment of reasonable royalties. One of the objections most
frequently raised in opposition to this proposal is the difficulty of determining
a reasonable royalty. But this objection will not withstand critical analysis.99
The courts have had no particular difficulty in solving essentially the same
problem in cases involving the assessment of damages for patent infringement.
That the damages judicially assessed in such cases have generally been reason-
able would seem a fair inference from the absence of any suggestion, much
less any agitation, for modifying established standards and procedures for re-
coupment of damages from infringement. In such cases, once the fact of in-
fringement is established, the aim is to redress the injury, or as the saying goes,
"make whole" the patentee. The proper measure of damages, therefore, is the
market value of the privilege of using the patent for the period of the infringe-
ment. And this is equivalent to a fair royalty.
Whether or not such a measure were made applicable to all patents, Con-
gress could at least give statutory sanction for compulsory licensing of patents
that (1) have been used to accomplish a violation of the antitrust acts, (2) have
been suppressed and (3) are subject to discriminatory licensing by patent
holders other than the inventor.
Perhaps the statute should specify a fourth situatior in which compulsory
licensing would be in order, namely, when a patent holder other than the
inventor exploits the patent but does not license it. The object of such a
provision would be to limit the privileges of corporations that accumulate a
great number of patents as a barricade against competition. 10 0 At the same
time, it would reserve for inventors, if they choose to exploit their inventions,
the "exclusive right" to do so.
The foregoing measures might not be wholly effective in restoring the
patent system to its constitutional function. But they should help materially
to stop its use in circumventing the antitrust laws. They would provide
constructive steps toward reform long overdue. A patent system thus revised
would complement, instead of obstructing and hampering, a public economic
"policy designed to foster free enterprise and preserve effective competition.
99. See, Borkin, Patent Abuses, Compulsion to License and Recent Decisions, 43
COL. L. REv. 720 (1943); and Feuer, The Patent Privilege and the TNEC Proposals,
14 TEMP. L.Q. 180, 192-93 (1940).
100. Only a natural person can "invent" anything. Corporations are ineligible, now,
to apply for patents. They can acquire patents only by assignment.
